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Abstract.  In addition to the GST, alcohol sold in Australia is subject to excise tax.  Although both 
beer and spirits are subject to a volumetric excise tax, wine is subject to an additional value added 
tax known as  the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET).   The recent  Henry tax review recommended 
substantial  changes  to  Australian  alcohol  taxation  policy.    Here,  the  implications  for  the  wine 
industry  of  the  Henry  tax  review  recommendations  are  explored  using  a  computable  general 
equilibrium model.  The results show that: (i) replacement of the WET with a revenue neutral 
volumetric excise tax would have a small negative impact on the wine industry; (ii) removal of the 
WET  rebate  would  have  a  substantial  negative  impact  on  small  wineries;  and  (iii)  applying  a 
uniform alcohol tax equal to the packaged beer excise rate across all alcoholic beverages would 
have a notable negative impact on the wine industry.   
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1  Introduction 
 
The 2010 Henry tax review found current taxation arrangement for beer, wine, and spirits to be 
incoherent.  To make alcohol tax policy more coherent, the review suggests a number of policy 
reforms.  In brief, the review recommends: (i) moving to a volumetric excise tax for all alcoholic 
beverages;  (ii)  the  application  of  excise  tax  rates  that  reflect  net  spillovers,  which  in  the  first 
instance are assumed to be common across beverages; and (iii) the removal of tax exemptions for 
small wine producers and international travellers.   
The reform objectives outlined in the Henry tax review have significant implications for 
all producers and consumers of alcoholic beverages; but implementing the review recommendations 
would result in especially significant changes to the way wine is taxed.  In the following paper a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to investigate the impact on the Australian 
wine industry of implementing the Henry tax review  recommendations.  So that the impact  of 
different changes can be seen, three scenarios are considered.  In the first scenario the impact of 
changing the basis of wine taxation from a value added tax to a revenue neutral volumetric tax is 
considered.  The second scenario assesses the impact of moving to a revenue neutral volumetric 
excise  tax,  where  in  addition,  the  wine  tax  rebate  system  is  discontinued.    The  third  scenario 
considers the impact of applying a uniform volumetric excise tax equal to the current packaged beer 
rate to all alcoholic beverages.   
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section two provides context by 
providing information on externality costs, explaining current alcohol taxation arrangements, and 
describing the findings of the Henry tax review.  In section three, Australian wine production and 
consumption information is presented, and in section four, the model used is explained.  Modelling  
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results, sensitivity analysis findings, and discussion are presented in section five; with concluding 
remarks presented in section six.      
2  Alcohol taxes, the tax review and externality costs 
2.1  Externality costs and current taxation arrangements 
The  social  costs  associated  with  excessive  alcohol  consumption  are  substantial.    For  example, 
Collins  and  Lapsley  (2008)  estimate  the  social  costs  associated  with  alcohol  consumption  in 
Australia for 2004-05 as: traffic cost $2,202 million, health cost $1,977 million, crime cost $1,611 
million, lost production cost $5,150 million, and intangible morbidity and mortality cost $4,489 
million.  The extent to which these costs represent externality costs is a matter of debate, with a 
fundamental issue being whether the unit of consideration should be the family or the individual.  If 
the focus is the family, any negative impacts on family members due to alcohol abuse by a member 
of the family are internal costs.  However, if the focus is the individual, negative impacts on family 
members must be considered.  The difference in the total externality cost between the individual 
utility  model  and  the  family  utility  model  is  large,  and  Freebairn  (2010)  uses  the  Collins  and 
Lapsley social cost data to show that the alcohol externality cost under the family utility model is 
around $5 billion; whereas under the individual utility model externality costs could be as high as 
$12 billion.   
Although there remains room for debate about the appropriate form and extent of alcohol 
excise  taxation,  the  existence  of  large  externality  costs  provides  a  sound  theoretical  basis  for 
imposing alcohol excise taxes.  In Australia, beer excise tax rates vary with alcohol content, and 
also depend on whether or not the beer is sold in a large keg format or in standard size bottles or 
cans.  For spirits, there is a concessional tax rate for brandy, and for wine a value added tax known 
as  the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET)  is  levied.  Both  the excise taxes  and the WET apply to 
consumption bases, with exports exempt and imports taxed.  The standard metric used to discuss  
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alcohol excise taxes is the per litre of pure alcohol (LAL) excise tax rate, and Table 1 provides 
details  on the effective LAL  tax rates for a representative sample of alcoholic beverages  as  at 
February 2011.
1  As can be seen from the table, low alcohol beer is lightly taxed; keg beer is taxed 
more lightly than beer of comparable strength sold in can s or bottles; bottled spirits and ready-to-
drink spirits  are heavily taxed; brandy receives a concessional tax rate relative to other bottled 
spirits; cask wine is lightly taxed; and premium wine is heavily taxed.  The very low tax rate for 
cask wine is  a feature of the Australian alcohol tax regime of  significant concern to the health 
profession (PHT 2008). 
Table 1  Effective alcohol excise tax rates 
Product category  Alcohol 
(%) 
LAL tax rate 
($) 
Light keg beer  2.5  3.96 
Mid keg beer  3.5  15.45 
Regular keg beer  5.0  23.18 
Light packaged beer  2.5  19.61 
Mid packaged beer  3.5  28.72 
Regular packaged beer  5.0  32.74 
Brandy  37.0  67.66 
All non brandy bottled spirits  37.0  72.46 
Ready-to-drink spirits  5.1  72.46 
Cask wine ($3.60 per litre)  12.6  4.15 
Wine ($15 per bottle)  12.6  23.02 
Wine ($30 per bottle)  12.6  46.03 
Note:  Beer excise rates are effective excise tax rates that adjust for the 
1.15 percent excise free component.   
Source: Beer and Spirits excise tax www.ato.gov.au and wine values use 
half retail price formula.  
  There  are  several  important  alcohol  excise  tax exemptions.    For  consumers,  the  most 
prominent exemption relates to international travel; with all adult persons entering Australia from 
overseas, whether they are visitors or returning citizens, allowed to enter the country with 2.25 litres 
of alcohol excise tax free.  For producers, the most prominent tax exemption applies to the wine 
industry.  Under the WET rebate scheme producers can claim a full rebate for WET paid up to a 
                                                        
1 Australian excise tax rates are indexed to CPI in February and August each year.  
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certain amount; which since July 2006 has been $500,000.  As the WET is levied at 29 percent of 
the wholesale value of the wine as it leaves the winery, the WET producer rebate results in the first 
$1.72 million in wholesale wine sales being excise tax free.  For retail sales the Australian Tax 
Office (ATO) calculates the WET producer rebate as .29 × .50 × dollar value of retail sales.  As 
such, the first $3.45 million in retail sales are excise tax free.  Many small producers therefore pay 
no WET, while for large producers the average WET paid is very close to the headline WET tax 
rate.  Additionally, as premium wine is heavily taxed, the rebate provides a strong incentive for 
small producers to focus on premium wine production.   
2.2  Henry tax review findings and recommendations  
The Henry tax review includes several observations and recommendations in the area of alcohol 
taxation.  The first observation is that establishing the optimal alcohol tax is difficult.  The optimal 
alcohol tax calculation is complicated because there is a level of consumption that is not harmful, 
and excise tax applies to both harmful and non-harmful consumption.  The optimal tax formula 
therefore requires information on externality costs; the demand responsiveness of consumers that 
consume at non-harmful levels; the demand responsiveness of consumers that consume at harmful 
levels;  and  the  proportion  of  harmful  and  non-harmful  consumption  (Pogue  and  Sgontz  1989; 
Kenkel 1996).   
  The second observation in the review is that social harm relates to alcohol content, not the 
type of beverage consumed, or where it is consumed.  From this observation it follows that all 
alcohol excise taxes should be based on alcohol content, and that the WET should be replaced with 
a volumetric tax.  It also implies that the current concessional tax treatment available for keg beer 
and brandy should be removed.  The review then argues that a common volumetric excise tax -- 
with  an  exemption  for  the  first  1.15  percent  of  alcohol  by  volume  --  should  apply  across  all 
alcoholic beverages.  The review highlights that such a system would allow the majority of the 
technical rules required to administer the current alcohol  excise tax regime to be removed and  
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would also remove the availability of very cheap alcohol products, such as cask wine.  Adjustments 
to the common alcohol excise tax rate would then only be made in light of information on beverage 
specific externality costs.   
  The third important observation made in the review is that alcohol excise tax should be 
concerned  with  social  harm;  not  industry  assistance,  regional  development,  or  small  enterprise 
assistance.  If the government wishes to provide industry assistance, the review argues that such 
assistance should be provided in a form “unrelated to the method or quantity of production”.  The 
WET  rebate  provides  subsidises  to  New  Zealand  producers  as  well  as  Australian  producers, 
discourages  economies  of  scale  in  wine  production,  and  is  specifically  identified  as  a  poorly 
targeted program.  
  Based on these observations the review outlines a reform path for alcohol excise taxation.  
The  most  immediate  reform  called  for  by  the  review  is  the  replacement  of  the  WET  with  a 
volumetric excise tax (AFTS 2010, p. 443).  The review does not explicitly state the excise tax rate 
that should be used to replace the WET, but the discussion in the review seems to imply moving to 
a revenue neutral volumetric excise tax as a first step.  The longer term reforms suggested are the 
removal of exemptions for small wine producers, and the application of a common alcohol excise 
tax equal to the current packaged beer tax rate.  The review recommends the current packaged beer 
tax  rate  as  once  the  1.15  percent  by  volume  excise  free  threshold  is  taken  into  account,  it  is 
approximately equal to the lower bound alcohol externality cost estimate for Australia contained in 
Cnossen (2010, p. 236) of $36 per LAL.   
3  Wine consumption and production 
3.1  Domestic wine consumption 
There  are  several  ways  of  considering  alcohol  consumption  data  to  determine  the  relative 
importance of each beverage.  One approach is to focus on the conditional budget share of each  
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beverage, where the conditional budget share of beverage i (i = beer, wine, spirits) at time t is 
denoted    , and is given by               where     is the price of beverage i at time t,     is the 
quantity of beverage i consumed at time t,              
 
      and             
      An alternative 
method of presenting information on the relative importance of  each beverage is to follow the 
approach of Fogarty (2006) and consider ethanol share information.  The ethanol share of beverage 
i, at time t, denoted    , can be found as              ; where     is the level of alcohol by volume for 
beverage i at time t,     is the quantity of beverage i consumed at time t,                  
     and 
            
     
  In 1989 total per capita ethanol consumption in Australia was 8.6 litres, and the ethanol 
shares were: 58 percent for beer, 27 percent for wine, and 14 percent for spirits (ABS 1998).  By 
2009 total per capita ethanol consumption in Australia had risen to 10.1 litres, and the ethanol 
shares were: 45 percent for beer, 35 percent for wine, and 20 percent for spirits (ABS 2010a).  So, 
while the Australian alcohol market as a whole has grown over the past 20 years, the relative 
importance of spirits and wine has increased, and the relative importance of beer has fallen.   
  Considering Australian wine consumption information in detail reveals that over the past 
20  years there has  also been a shift  towards drinking higher quality  wine.  The trend towards 
consumption of higher quality wine can be seen in the shift away from consumption of low quality 
cask wine towards consumption of higher quality bottled wine.  For example, between 1989 and 
2009 total per capita wine consumption of domestically produced wine rose from 18.1 litres to 21.5 
liters, while per capita consumption of domestically produced cask wine fell from 11.3 litres to 9.0 
liters (ABS 2010b; 2010c; 2008; 1998).  
  A  further  trend  in  the  domestic  wine  market  has  been  the  growth  of  imports.    For 
Australia, the most important source country for wine imports in volume terms has historically been 
Italy, while in value terms it has historically been France.  However, New Zealand overtook Italy in  
  9 
2003 to become the most important source country for wine imports in volume terms, and overtook 
France in 2005 to also become the most important source country in value terms.  The change in the 
composition of wine imports can be seen in Figure 1, where the figure on the left shows the quantity 
of wine imports, and the figure on the right shows the value of wine imports.  In volume terms New 
Zealand now accounts for 69 percent of all wine imports, and in value terms New Zealand’s market 
share is now 56 percent (ABS 2010b).   
Figure 1  Volume and value of wine imports into Australia 
 
Note:  Years are financial years. 
Source: ABS (various), Australian Wine and Grape Industry, Catalogue 1329.0. 
3.2  Domestic wine production  
The overall size and focus of the Australian wine industry has changed substantially since the mid 
1990s.  For example, in 1995 total wine sales were 427 million litres, and about one quarter of 
production was exported.  By 2002 total sales had increased to 804 million litres, and more than 
half total production was exported.  For a variety of reasons, including drought, export volumes 
have been flat in recent years, but in 2010 the wine industry sold 1,259 million litres of wine, and 
export sales accounted for almost two thirds of total sales.  The most important export destinations 
for Australian wine are the UK and the US, and these two markets account for 63 percent of export 
sales in volume terms, and 61 percent of export sales in value terms (ABS 2010b).  The volume and 
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Figure 2  Volume and value of Australian wine exports 
 
Note:  Years are financial years. 
Source: ABS (various), Australian Wine and Grape Industry, Catalogue 1329.0. 
Wine production in Australia is highly concentrated, and for the  2010 vintage just 13 
wineries  accounted  for  74  percent  of  the  total  national  crush  (ABS  2010b).    Based  on  the 
information  contained  in  the  AWBC  Winefacts  database,
2  the  three  main  Australian  wine 
production regions are  the Riverland (SA), Swan Hill (Vic.), and  Riverina (NSW); and in 2008 
these three regions  accounted for, respectively, 22.8 percent, 20.7 percent, and  17.1 percent of 
national production.  All three of these regions are hot irrigated regions where yields are relatively 
high, but per tonne prices for grap es are relatively low.  As such,  the relative importance of these 
three regions is significantly lower in value terms, with the Riverland accounting for 15.9 percent of 
the value of production; Swan Hill accounting for 14.1 percent of the value of production; and the 
Riverina accounting for 10.4 percent of the value of production.   The regions reporting the highest 
average grape sales prices are: Margaret River (WA), Mornington Peninsular (Vic.), Tasmania, and 
Yarra Valley (Vic.); and combined, these four regions account for 3.7 percent of production in 
volume terms, and 7.9 percent of production in value terms. 
  Over recent vintages there has been a consi derable supply-demand imbalance for wine 
grapes which has meant the prices received by growers have been falling.   Based on the values 
reported in Gunning-Trant (2010), current average prices for red grape varieties are around $1,000 
per tonne for cool cli mate grapes, and a bit less than $500 pe r tonne for warm climate grapes.   
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These prices are approximately half the respective average per tonne prices paid in 2000.  The fall 
in white grape prices since 2000 has been less pronounced than the fall in red grape prices, with 
average prices for white grape varieties from cool climates falling from around $1,500 per tonne to 
around $1,000 per tonne, and average prices for white grape varieties from warm climates falling 
from just over $500 per tonne to just below $500 per tonne.  It should however be noted that grape 
prices in 2000 were relatively high, with average grape prices for the 2000 vintage 81 percent 
higher than for the 1990 vintage (ABS 2000).   
  Regarding the overall financial health of the Australian wine industry, some indication of 
performance can be gained by considering the annual Winemakers’ Federation of Australia-Deloitte 
survey on industry profitability.  Table 2 provides details on the average earnings before tax for 
wineries  of  different  sizes  through  time,  as  reported  in  the  various  WFA-Deloitte  surveys.  
Performance in the 2006-08 period was impacted by drought, but in general, it is only the largest 
wineries that have consistently been profitability.   
Table 2  Winery earnings as a percentage of total revenue by winery size (percent) 
Earnings before tax  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Ave 
Firm revenue less than $1M  -15.9  6.3  0.3  8.1  -18.6  1.9  -7.4  -3.6 
Firm revenue $1M to $5M  1.9  -7.9  8.0  2.7  -0.7  -8.7  8.2  0.5 
Firm revenue $5M to $10M  7.4  3.8  -4.2  -4.2  12.2  9.8  0.8  3.7 
Firm revenue $10M to $20M  24.7  -7.0  -8.7  -7.0  10.0  7.4  -7.4  1.7 
Firm revenue greater than $20M  12.3  15.3  10.3  6.3  17.3  18.8  22.1  14.6 
Source: WFA- Deloitte (2003 through 2009).  
4  Model structure 
The core database used for the CGE model was derived from the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database released in 2008.  The database is a fully documented publicly available global  
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database which contains complete bilateral trade information, and transport and protection linkages 
among regions for all GTAP commodities.
3 
4.1  Consumer utility and model structure 
For  modelling  purposes  consumer  utility  has  been  represented  using  a  Constant  Difference  of 
Elasticities (CDE) utility function.  The CDE function was proposed by Hanoch (1975), and in the 
context of CGE modelling, popularised by Hertel et al. (1991) and Hertel (1997).  In the model the 
three aggregate alcohol products beer, wine, and spirits enter at the top level of the utility function, 
and below each beverage is a product nest for the individual market segments.  For beer, the market 
segments are: light beer, mid-strength beer, regular beer, and premium beer, all in either keg format 
or as packaged beer; for spirits, the market segments are: spirits, light ready-to-drink spirits, and 
dark ready-to-drink spirits; and for wine, the market segments are: 4&5 litre casks, 2 litre casks, 
wines less than $7 per bottle, wines between $7 and $15 per bottle, wines between $15 and $20 per 
bottle, wines between $20 and $30 per bottle, and wine costing more than $30 per bottle.   
For beer and spirits a CES nest structure has been used to capture substitution between 
different market segments.  For wine, the more flexible CRESH structure has been used.  For each 
wine  market  segment  an  additional  CES  nest  is  then  added  to  allow  for  substitution  between 
imported wine, domestic wine from large producers that have a net WET liability, and domestic 
wine  from  small  producers  that  have  no  net  WET  liability.    The  detailed  database  developed 
assumes small producers do not produce 4&5 litre cask wine products, and so the overall structure 
of the model can be visualised as shown in Figure 3.   
                                                        
3 Detailed documentation on the CGE model used is available from the authors on request.  
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Figure 3  Utility tree representation of the model structure 
 
 
In terms of production costs, small WET free producers are assumed to have production 
costs that are higher than those of large producers by approximately the value of the WET rebate.  
This means that across each market segment the retail prices of wines from large wineries and small 
wineries are approximately the same.  It is further assumed that across large wineries and small 
wineries  there  is  a  specific  profit  centre  for  each  market  segment  that  has  a  specific  capital 
requirement.  The share of capital assumed to be specific to each market segment has been set at 15 
percent.  This approach means that as demand for a specific market segment falls or rises there can 
be a slight decrease or increase in the return to that market segment.  The overall return to small 
wineries and large wineries, in terms of the average dollar margin per litre of wine sold, is however 
held constant.  This structure has been chosen as it allows an export response following the tax 
changes considered.  The impact of assuming there is no export response following the tax changes 
considered is discussed as part of the sensitivity analysis.   
For imports, the average per litre import price to Australia for each country of origin has 
been  used  to  allocate  wine  imports  to  different  quality  categories.    To  illustrate  the  allocation 
process for wine imports, consider the specific case of Italy.  The average import price for wine 
from Italy is $5.69.  At the comparable point in the supply chain the assumed average per litre price 
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wine in the $15 to $20 price category is $8.60.  As $5.47 × .93 + $8.60 × .07 = $5.69, the allocation 
rule used sees 93 percent of the volume of imports from Italy allocated to the $7 to $15 price 
category, and seven percent allocated to the $15 to $20 price category.   
As New Zealand producers are eligible for a WET rebate, and consideration is given to 
removal of the WET rebate, this feature also needs to be incorporated into the analysis.  The only 
source of information on the value of the WET rebate to New Zealand producers that could be 
found was Australian Government (2005, p. 39), and this indicated that the value of the rebate to 
New Zealand producers would reach $9 million by 2008-09.  The assumption used is that there are 
18 large producers in New Zealand, each receives the maximum rebate of $500,000, and the rebate 
is allocated across market segments in the same proportion as total New Zealand wine imports.     
A  range  of  data  sources  were  used  to  create  the  database  including:  ABS  (catalogue 
numbers 1329, 4307, and 8504), Wittwer et al. (2009), ATO and AWBC data, the WFA-Deloitte 
benchmarking surveys, and several unpublished industry reports.   
4.2  Income, own-price, and substitution elasticity values  
The parameterisation of the CDE utility function relies on unconditional compensated own-price 
elasticity values, and unconditional income elasticity values.  Across the alcohol demand studies of 
Australia that have been published since the 1980s, the average unconditional income elasticity 
values are: beer .66, wine .65, and spirits 2.08; and the average unconditional compensated own-
price elasticity values are: beer -.37, wine -.40, and spirits -.96 (Fogarty 2010).
4  As noted above, for 
beer and spirits a CES nest has been used  to capture substitution between market segments.   The 
default elasticity of substitution value in both these nests has been set at 2.0.   
                                                        
4 The meta-analysis identified a trend in the data for own-price and income elasticity values which is in part why the sample has 
been restricted to studies published since the 1980s.  The other reason is that the estimation methods of the earlier papers are not 
especially robust.    
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A CRESH specification has been used for the wine nest, and for the CRESH specification 
the compensated own-price elasticity formula can be expressed as               
    , where     is 
the own-price elasticity of good i,    is the elasticity of substitution for good i,   
   
           
             , 
where    is the (conditional) budget share of good i,      
 
      , and    is a parameter that is less 
than one, but not zero.  As an individual elasticity of substitution value can be specified for each 
good in the nest, it is possible to set the elasticity of substitution values with target own-price 
elasticity values in mind.  The default price elasticity values are as follows: 4&5 litre casks -.31, 
premium casks -.42, less than $7 per bottle -.55, $7-$15 per bottle -.66, $15-$20 per bottle -.75, 
$20-$30 per bottle -.88, more than $30 per bottle -.98.  The pattern of the own-price elasticity 
values being more responsive as quality increases is consistent with the demand structures used in 
Wittwer and Anderson (2002), and also consistent with evidence for the alcohol market as a whole 
(Clements et al. 1997).  As part of the sensitivity analysis the default own-price elasticity values 
were scaled up and down by 20 percent and 40 percent.  For completeness, the sensitivity analysis 
also  considers  a  scenario  where  the  market  segment  level  own-price  elasticity  values  were  all 
assumed to be -.66.   
  For wine as a composite good, the approach of Wittwer and Anderson (2002), where 4.0 is 
used as the Armington elasticity of substitution between imported wine and domestic wine, and 8.0 
is used as the elasticity of substitution for imports from different destinations, appears appropriate.  
However, as the current application involves several wine categories, these values are not directly 
applicable.  For low value wine substitution is expected to be strong, but for premium wine where 
terroir  is  important  substitution  is  expected  to  be  more  subdued.    Reflecting  this,  the  default 
elasticity  of  substitution  value  for  imports,  wine  from  small  producers,  and  wine  from  large 
producers has been set  at 6.0 for the lowest three wine quality market segments; 4.0 for wine 
between $7 and $20 per bottle; 2.0 for wine between $20 and $30 per bottle; and 1.5 for wine  
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costing more than $30 per bottle.  The same elasticity values are also used for demand in the rest of 
the world which imports wine from Australia.  As part of the sensitivity analysis these values were 
scaled up and down by 20 percent and 40 percent, with the implication of assuming a uniform 
elasticity of substitution value of 4.0 also considered.   
4.3  Other assumptions 
The  actual  retail  price  changes  modelled  depend  in  part  on  the  product  mark  up  assumption.  
Assuming retailers maintain constant absolute margins implies that only the incremental effect of 
the  tax  change  (and  the  GST  effect)  will  be  passed  on  to  consumers.    Assuming  a  constant 
percentage margin implies that retailers will pass on more than the additional tax impost for the 
alcoholic beverages whose prices are rising, and reduce prices further for the alcoholic beverages 
whose prices are falling.  The main results report findings based on the constant per litre retail 
margin assumption, with the impact of assuming a constant percentage mark up considered as part 
of the sensitivity analysis.    
  As the WET is based on value not alcohol content, wine producers have not felt the need 
to control the alcohol content of the wine they produce, and over the past 20 years the average 
alcohol content of Australian wine has gradually risen.  For example, Godden and Gishen (2005) 
report that between 1984 and 2004 the average alcohol content of Australian red wine increased by 
1.6 percentage points, and that between 1985 and 2000 the average alcohol content of Australian 
white wine increased by  1.0 percentage point.  The change to  a volumetric alcohol tax would 
provide producers with a strong incentive to reduce the alcohol content of their wines.  As such, it is 
assumed  that  although  the  revenue  neutral  tax rate  imposed  is  calculated  based  on  an  average 
alcohol content for wine of 12.65 percent, the actual average alcohol content of wine once the 
system  is  introduced  is  actually  11.65  percent.    The  impact  of  assuming  producers  ignore  the 
incentive to reduce the alcohol content of their wine is noted in the sensitivity analysis.    
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  With a change to a volumetric tax, the value of the WET rebate for products sold in each 
market segment would change.  To simplify matters, for the scenario that assumes a producer rebate 
system is retained, the assumption used is that if a winery had a zero net WET liability prior to the 
tax change they have a zero net excise tax liability after the change to a volumetric tax. 
5  Results, sensitivity analysis, and discussion 
5.1  Domestic wine consumption impacts 
The estimated changes in domestic wine prices and consumption for the three scenarios considered 
are shown in Table 3.  Consistent with the Henry tax review recommendations, under all scenarios 
the first 1.15 percent of alcohol by volume is excise tax exempt.  
Table 3  Domestic price and consumption changes following wine tax reform: by market segment and scenario 
 
Scenario A: Revenue neutral 
volumetric wine tax of $15.75 
per LAL, retain producer rebate 
  Scenario B: Revenue neutral 
volumetric wine tax of $13.38 per 
LAL, no producer rebate 
  Scenario C: Common 
volumetric alcohol tax of $42.31 
per LAL, no producer rebate 
  %   price 
retail 
%   in 
quantity 
  volume 
M L 
  %   price 
retail 
%   in 
quantity 
  volume 
M L 
  %   price 
retail 
%   in 
quantity 
  volume 
M L 
4&5 litre casks  45.43   (10.99)  (15.40)    37.23   (9.36)  (13.12)    154.33   (26.86)  (37.63) 
Premium casks  13.47   (5.31)  (3.07)    11.26   (4.49)  (2.60)    70.00   (20.07)  (11.61) 
<$7/ bottle  10.58   (6.13)  (4.13)    10.00   (5.76)  (3.88)    64.58   (22.68)  (15.29) 
$7-$15/ bottle  (1.27)  (.71)  (.87)    (1.55)  (.18)  (.22)    27.06   (12.20)  (15.10) 
$15-$20/ bottle  (6.43)  5.06   4.75     (5.93)  4.69   4.41     10.91   1.00   .93  
$20-$30/ bottle  (6.97)  4.96   1.34     (5.39)  3.49   .94     6.52   3.59   .97  
>$30/ bottle  (13.71)  14.38   1.86     (13.66)  14.70   1.90     (6.16)  20.18   2.61  
Overall  4.29   (2.97)  (15.52)    3.45   (2.40)  (12.57)    39.16   (14.36)  (75.11) 
 
The modelling suggests that following the introduction of a revenue neutral volumetric 
tax, with a rebate system retained (Scenario A), the weighted average retail price of domestic wine 
would increase by 4.3 percent, and total domestic wine consumption would fall by 3.0 percent, or 
15.5 million litres.  Across the individual market segments, prices would increase substantially for 
the three lowest quality market segments, be little changed in the $7-$15 per bottle segment, and 
fall across the three highest quality segments.  The biggest impact is on cask wine sales, which fall 
by 18.5 million litres.  Although cask wine sales fall substantially, it is worth noting that in standard 
drink terms, after the tax change cask wine is still the cheapest alcohol product by a considerable  
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margin.  Specifically, the Scenario A tax change raises the cost of a standard drink in terms of 4&5 
litre  cask  wine from  $.34 to  $.48,  and leaves  the cost of  a standard  drink  in  terms  of  regular 
packaged beer and bottled spirits unchanged, at, respectively, $1.25, and $1.62. 
Under  Scenario  B  the  producer  rebate  is  removed.    The  revenue  neutral  tax  rate  is 
therefore slightly lower than under Scenario A.  The overall impacts on domestic consumption 
under Scenario B, are, however, broadly similar to those under Scenario A.  
  Applying the current packaged beer tax rate to all alcoholic beverages, with the WET 
producer rebate removed (Scenario C), would have a substantial negative impact on domestic wine 
sales.  All but the most expensive wine would increase in price, and the weighted average price of 
wine would increase by almost 40 percent.  Overall, domestic wine consumption would fall by 
around 75.1 million litres, or 14.4 percent.  The cheapest wine products would increase in price by 
more than 150 percent, and total cask wine sales would fall by almost 50 million litres.  The tax 
change would substantially reduce the difference in the standard drink price of cask wine and other 
alcoholic beverages, but in standard drink terms, 4&5 litre cask wine would remain approximately 
50 percent cheaper than either regular packaged beer or bottled spirits.  Specifically, under Scenario 
C, the respective standard drink prices for 4&5 litre cask wine, regular packaged beer, and bottled 
spirits are, $.84, $1.24, and $1.22.   
  Although details on imports are not reported in Table 3, it can be noted that as imports are 
strongly represented in the higher price market segments, in general, imports benefit from a shift to 
a volumetric tax.  Additionally, as most imported wine does not benefit from the WET producer 
rebate, removal of the producer rebate improves  the relative competitiveness of most imported 
wines.  The specific impacts on imports under each scenario are as follows: under Scenario A 
imports increase by 2.4 million litres, or 4.6 percent; under Scenario B imports increase by 4.1  
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million litres, or 8.6 percent; and under Scenario C imports increase by 1.2 million litres, or 2.0 
percent.  
5.2  Domestic wine production impacts 
For production changes it is helpful to consider separately, production impacts at small and large 
wineries; and production impacts in terms of sales into the domestic market and sales into export 
markets.  First, consider the information in the last six columns of Table 4 that show the impact on 
total  domestic  sales,  total  export  sales,  and  total  production.    Under  Scenario  A,  domestic 
production for the domestic market falls across the cheapest wine market segments; increases across 
the higher quality market segments; and in total falls by 17.9 million litres.  Following the tax 
change the average per litre profit margin at both large and small wineries is the same as it was 
prior to the tax change, but as each market segment has a specific profit margin, following the 
decrease in domestic demand for low quality wines the profit margin for low quality wine shrinks 
slightly.  With a slightly lower profit margin for low quality wine there is an export response equal 
to  approximately  one  third  the  loss  in  domestic  sales.    The  very  slight  decrease  in  exports  of 
premium wine arises because with the average per litre profit margin held constant, the slight fall in 
the profit margin for low quality wine implies a slight increase in the profit margin for premium 
wines.  The impact on total production is given in the final column of Table 4, and the modelling 
indicates that the introduction of a revenue neutral volumetric wine tax, with the producer rebate 
retained, would result in domestic wine production falling by 12.2 million litres, or one percent. 
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Table 4  Domestic production and supply changes following wine tax reform: by market segment and scenario 
  Scenario A: Revenue neutral volumetric wine tax of $15.75 per LAL, retain producer rebate 




Total domestic sales  Total export sales  Total production 
 
  in 
quantity 
ML 
%   in 
quantity 
    in 
quantity 
ML 
%   in 
quantity 
    in 
quantity 
ML 
%   in 
quantity 
  in 
quantity 
ML 
%   in 
quantity 
  in 
quantity 
ML 
%   in 
quantity 
4&5 litre casks  .00   .00     (10.86)  (2.45)    (14.77)  (11.21)  3.91   1.26   (10.86)  (2.45) 
Premium casks  1.81   58.82     (4.62)  (7.43)    (2.96)  (5.23)  .15   1.69   (2.81)  (4.31) 
<$7/ bottle  1.44   3.94     (3.96)  (1.12)    (4.02)  (6.05)  1.50   .46   (2.51)  (.64) 
$7-$15/ bottle  (.98)  (3.76)    .52   .28     (.75)  (.65)  .28   .29   (.46)  (.22) 
$15-$20/ bottle  (3.05)  (15.48)    5.48   7.23     2.44   3.48   (.00)  (.00)  2.44   2.55  
$20-$30/ bottle  (1.00)  (5.71)    1.95   5.86     1.04   4.28   (.09)  (.34)  .95   1.88  
>$30/ bottle  (.05)  (8.84)    1.14   8.46     1.10   15.19   (.01)  (.21)  1.09   7.76  
Overall  (1.82)  (1.76)    (10.35)  (.89)    (17.90)  (3.80)  5.73   .72   (12.17)  (.96) 
Scenario B: Revenue neutral volumetric wine tax of $13.38 per LAL, no producer rebate 
4&5 litre casks  .00   .00     (9.58)  (2.17)    (13.09)  (9.94)  3.50   1.13   (9.58)  (2.17) 
Premium casks  (1.36)  (44.15)    (1.14)  (1.84)    (2.66)  (4.70)  .16   1.87   (2.50)  (3.83) 
<$7/ bottle  (1.49)  (4.08)    (.77)  (.22)    (3.91)  (5.89)  1.65   .51   (2.26)  (.58) 
$7-$15/ bottle  (5.17)  (19.84)    4.85   2.61     (.96)  (.84)  .64   .67   (.32)  (.15) 
$15-$20/ bottle  (6.04)  (30.66)    8.25   10.88     2.09   2.99   .12   .48   2.22   2.32  
$20-$30/ bottle  (2.07)  (11.87)    2.43   7.31     .50   2.06   (.14)  (.54)  .36   .71  
>$30/ bottle  (.16)  (28.10)    1.21   8.97     1.05   14.45   .00   .01   1.05   7.49  
Overall  (16.29)  (15.74)    5.25   .45     (16.98)  (3.60)  5.94   .74   (11.04)  (.87) 
Scenario C: Common volumetric alcohol tax of $42.31 per LAL, no producer rebate 
4&5 litre casks  .00   .00     (26.05)  (5.89)    (36.06)  (27.38)  10.00   1.26   (26.05)  (5.89) 
Premium casks  (1.26)  (41.14)    (9.75)  (15.68)    (11.47)  (20.26)  .45   1.69   (11.01)  (16.88) 
<$7/ bottle  (1.57)  (4.29)    (7.73)  (2.18)    (15.11)  (22.76)  5.81   .46   (9.30)  (2.38) 
$7-$15/ bottle  (5.18)  (19.88)    (7.51)  (4.04)    (14.63)  (12.70)  1.94   .29   (12.69)  (5.99) 
$15-$20/ bottle  (5.42)  (27.54)    4.72   6.23     (.74)  (1.06)  .04   (.00)  (.70)  (.73) 
$20-$30/ bottle  (1.73)  (9.90)    2.04   6.12     .54   2.20   (.23)  (.34)  .31   .61  
>$30/ bottle  (.12)  (21.20)    1.39   10.34     1.35   18.62   (.08)  (.21)  1.27   9.08  
Overall  (15.28)  (14.77)    (42.89)  (3.68)    (76.11)  (16.14)  17.94   .72   (58.17)  (4.58) 
 
  Now, consider the information in the first four columns of Table 4 that describe the impact 
on small and large wineries.  For Scenario A, the impact on large wineries mirrors the impact on the 
industry as a whole, but the impact on small wineries shows the opposite pattern.  This is because 
the  production  of  small  wineries  is  tax  exempt,  and  the  change  from  a  value  based  tax  to  a 
volumetric tax shifts the comparative advantage of small wineries away from the production of 
premium wine towards lower quality wine.  With small winery production expected to decrease by 
1.8 percent, and large winery production expected to decrease by only .9 percent, in relative terms, 
small wineries are also more negatively affected than large wineries.  The impact on small wineries 
is greater because, in line with the change in their comparative advantage, they shift production  
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away from expensive, relatively high margin wine, to cheap, relatively low margin wine, and given 
average profit per litre is held constant, they are constrained in their ability to lower the prices of 
their premium wines.     
  Under Scenario B, the results for total domestic sales, exports, and total production are 
broadly the same as for Scenario A.  The main difference in results is the relative impact on small 
producers  and  large  producers.    Removal  of  the  WET  producer  rebate  results  in  a  substantial 
increase in production costs for small wineries, and a very small increase in production costs for 
large wineries.  As such, the introduction of a volumetric tax, combined with the removal of the 
WET producer rebate, results in small winery sales falling in every market segment, and total small 
winery production falling by 15.7 percent, or 16.3 million litres.  For large wineries the gain in 
relative  competitiveness  following  the  withdrawal  of  the  WET  producer  rebate  more  than 
compensates  for the impact  of  a volumetric tax so  that unlike  Scenario A where large winery 
production fell by 10.4 million litres, under Scenario B, large winery production increases by 5.2 
million litres.    
  Under Scenario C, total domestic wine production is expected to fall by 58.2 million litres, 
comprised of a fall of 76.1 million litres in production for the domestic market, and an increase in 
exports of 18.0 million litres.  For small wineries, application of a volumetric tax of $42.31 per 
LAL means the loss in relative competitiveness due to the removal of the WET is much diminished.  
As such, the overall fall in sales at small wineries under Scenario C is approximately the same as 
under Scenario B.  With total production at large wineries expected to fall by 42.9 million litres, or 
3.7 percent, the impact on large producers under Scenario C is significant.      
5.3  Employment and taxation impacts 
The change to a revenue neutral volumetric tax with a producer rebate system maintained is likely 
to result in only modest job losses within the wine industry.  Specifically, total direct employment  
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within the industry is expected to fall by only 150 full time equivalent (FTE) jobs.  Although total 
production  at  both  large  wineries  and  small  wineries  decreases  following  the  tax  change,  the 
implied impact on employment is quite different at small wineries and large wineries.  Following 
the  tax  change  large  wineries  shift  their  production  focus  towards  premium  wine,  and  small 
wineries shift their production focus towards lower quality wine.  As premium wine production is 
relatively labour intensive, the change in production focus implies job growth of 35 FTE jobs at 
large wineries, and the loss of 185 FTE jobs at small wineries.  To put these changes in perspective, 
note that total direct employment in the wine industry is around 29,000 FTE jobs.  
  The  removal  of  the  producer  rebate  reduces  the  competitiveness  of  small  producers 
substantially. So, while the total FTE job losses under Scenario B are approximately the same as 
under Scenario A, the net job change is comprised of 921 FTE job losses at small wineries, and 
employment growth of 774 FTE jobs at large wineries. 
Under Scenario C, the employment impacts across the wine industry are somewhat greater 
than under Scenario A and B.  Specifically, employment losses at small wineries are estimated to be 
851 FTE jobs, and employment losses at large wineries are estimated to be 1,088 FTE jobs.  Total 
direct industry job losses under Scenario C are therefore equal to 6.8 percent of total direct wine 
industry employment.   
Two additional aspects of the employment impact can be noted.  First, the employment 
impact on the wine industry is not equal to the net impact on employment.  As vines in irrigated 
regions are replaced with other agricultural products, there will be employment growth in these 
replacement industries.  Second, employment impacts will not be felt uniformly across all wine 
growing regions, with negative impacts concentrated in regions such as Riverland, Swan Hill and 
Riverina,  and  positive  impacts  concentrated  in  regions  such  as  Margaret  River,  Mornington  
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Peninsular,  Tasmania,  Yarra  Valley,  and  other  places  that  are  focused  on  premium  grape 
production.   
A  uniform  tax  rate  equal  to  the  current  packaged  beer  tax  rate  would  also  raise  an 
additional $1.1 billion in tax revenue; comprising $1.5 billion in extra wine tax revenue, $.2 billion 
in extra beer tax revenue, and a reduction of $.6 billion in spirits tax revenue. 
5.4  Sensitivity analysis 
The move to a revenue neutral volumetric wine tax where a tax rebate program remains in place is 
thought the most plausible tax reform  achievable, and is also  consistent with the first stage of 
reform recommended by the Henry tax review.  As such, the sensitivity analysis focuses on the 
impact of varying the assumptions for Scenario A.  The alcohol content assumption and product 
mark-up assumption were found to have very little impact on the results.  The product mark-up 
assumption does, however, become important when considering scenarios that involve very large 
price changes, such as those involved under Scenario C.  The other assumptions varied as part of 
the sensitivity analysis related to the market segment elasticity settings; the elasticity of substitution 
settings; and the possible export response.  In terms of approach, the sensitivity analysis follows the 
ideas and suggestions contained in Pannell (1997).   
  As can be seen from Figure 4, varying the import vs domestic production substitution 
elasticity made little impact to the overall result, while varying the market segment elasticity values 
has a relatively large impact on the result.  Specifically, if demand responsiveness is assumed to be 
uniform across all market categories rather than variable, total domestic demand is estimated to fall 
by 25.1 million litres, or 2.0 percent, rather than 12.2 million litres or 1.0 percent.   
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Figure 4  Sensitivity of results to variation in the elasticity settings  
 
 
As noted above, there has been a supply-demand imbalance for wine grapes in recent 
years.  This imbalance is reflected in both harvest information and changes in the area of land 
planted to wine grapes.  For example, approximately nine percent of the area bearing, or 158,000 
tonnes of fruit was not harvested in 2009 (Gunning-Trant 2010); and in 2010 the net loss in area 
bearing was 6,800 hectares (ABS 2010b).  Given substantial quantities of grapes are being left on 
the vine to rot, and given the area being planted to grapes is being reduced, it could be argued that 
export markets are not a viable destination for surplus Australian wine production.  As such, one of 
the  sensitivities  explored  was  a  scenario  where  there  is  no  export  response  following  the 
replacement of the WET with a volumetric tax.  With no export response, the decrease in domestic 
production is estimated to be 18.4 million litres rather than 12.2 million litres.  In percentage terms, 
holding the export response to zero implies a fall in production of 1.5 percent, rather than the 1.0 
percent fall for the case where there is an export response.        
5.5  Discussion  
The case for moving to a volumetric wine tax is strong, and the results presented suggest that 
moving to a revenue neutral volumetric tax would not place a substantial additional burden on the 
wine industry.  Although the overall negative impact is likely to be quite modest, negative impacts 
will be felt most strongly in the Riverland, Swan Hill, and Riverina regions; and positive impacts 
will be felt most strongly in the premium wine growing regions.  In terms of the mechanics of 
moving to a revenue neutral volumetric tax for wine, a reasonable approach would be to gradually 
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reduce the WET rate over a number of  years, while at the same time gradually increasing the 
volumetric tax element.  Such an approach would provide sufficient time for producers to adjust 
production, and is also broadly consistent with previously suggested reforms (WWIA 1995).   
At the time of the Henry review there was only limited Australian evidence that alcohol 
externality costs varied by beverage type.  However, since the review evidence has been published 
that indicates alcohol externality costs in Australia do vary across beverage types.  Specifically, 
Srivastava and Zhoa (2010) analysed national drug strategy survey data and found that: heavy binge 
drinkers are more likely to drink regular strength beer or RTDs; regular beer and RTD drinkers are 
more likely to drive a car or operate hazardous machinery while under the influence of alcohol; and 
beer drinkers and spirit drinkers are more likely than wine drinkers to report they missed study or 
work due to alcohol consumption.  The drink driving result is consistent with an earlier study in 
Western Australia that found: (i) no impact from wine sales at licensed premises to drink driving 
incidents; (ii) higher spirit sales at licensed premises were associated with more drunk driving but 
not accidents; and (iii) higher beer sales at licensed premises were associated with more accident 
and non-accident drink driving (Gruenewald et al., 1999).   
Given the large proportion of total alcohol externality costs associated with drunk driving, 
binge drinking incidents, and lost tax revenue from lower productivity, the findings of Srivastava 
and Zhoa (2010) suggest that the wine industry could reasonably argue that wine consumption is 
associated with lower externality costs than other beverages, and as such should be eligible for a 
concessional tax rate.  As such, it would seem appropriate to conduct further research into the extent 
to which externality costs -- as well as health benefits -- vary across beverage types before lifting 
the volumetric wine tax above the revenue neutral excise tax rate.  More generally, it would seem 
appropriate to fund research that would generate the information required to set optimal alcohol 
taxes in line with the conceptual framework of Pogue and Sgontz (1989), and then use this approach 
to establish the optimal beer, wine, and spirits tax rates.      
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The rational for the existence of the WET producer rebate is often framed in terms of 
regional development.  It is, however, difficult to disagree with the observation in the Henry tax 
review  that  the  excise  tax  system  is  not  the  appropriate  tool  to  use  for  achieving  regional 
development objectives.  It is also not clear that wineries are more deserving of tax breaks than 
other regional business operators.  The removal of the producer rebate would, however, seriously 
erode the relatively competitiveness of many small wineries, and result in a reduction in consumer 
choice.  Before removing the producer rebate, research into the value of the additional consumer 
surplus generated by the additional wine consumption choices created by the rebate is warranted.      
6  Conclusion 
The move to a revenue neutral volumetric wine tax, with rebate provisions for small producers 
retained, would change relative prices for wine products substantially, but in aggregate the change 
would have only a modest negative impact on the Australian wine industry.  The change would, 
however, result in a substantial improvement in Australian alcohol tax policy.  The removal of the 
producer rebate would have a significant negative impact on small wineries, and application of a 
common volumetric alcohol tax at the current packaged beer rate would have a substantial negative 
impact on the wine industry as a whole.   
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